News

Moral suasion paper featured in AEA journals Research Highlight

European domestic banks were more likely to buy bonds issued by the governments when default looked imminent. What persuaded them? See https://www.aeaweb.org/research/moral-suasion-european-debt-crisis

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New working paper on the role of cash in firm investment after a financial crisis

In my new working paper “All you need is cash: Corporate cash holdings and investment after the financial crisis” Andi Joseph, Christiane Kneer and Jumana Saleheen show that cash is a critical asset to have when a financial crisis hits. It enables firms to continue to invest during the crisis when rivals cannot. This gives cash-rich firms a competitive edge that lasts far beyond the crisis years. 

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Panel discussion on the role of non-banks in the economy at ESRB Annual Conference.

At the fourth ESRB Annual Conference I discussed the link between demographic changes and non-bank activity in the mortgage market. I highlighted the role insurers can play unlocking cash when retirees are asset rich but cash poor.  See here my presentation

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My paper “The Invisible Hand of the Government” accepted for American Economic Journal – Macroeconomics

My paper “The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis” written jointly with Steven Ongena and Alexander Popov has been accepted for the American Economic Journal – Macroeconomics. Using a novel two-layered identification strategy we provide evidence of moral suasion affecting government bond markets during the European sovereign debt crisis. During the height of the sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks were more likely than foreign banks to purchase domestic sovereign bonds during months in which the government needed to roll over a relatively large amount of maturing debt. Domestic banks that received government support, are small or with weaker balance sheets were particularly susceptible to moral suasion. Governance of banks played less of a role.

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Panel discussion on policy evaluation at the 2018 CEBRA Annual Meeting

At the 2018 CEBRA Annual Meeting the Deutsche Bundesbank and Financial Stability Board organized a high‐level panel on the evaluation of the G20 regulatory reforms. Together with Dietrich Domanski (FSB) and Joao Santos (NY Fed), I discussed the challenges and opportunities of policy evaluation. See here my presentation [link to ppt].

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New working paper on the impact of the leverage ratio on repo market functioning

In my new working paper “Repo Market Functioning: The Role of Capital Regulation”, Antonis Kotidis and I show that a tightening of the leverage ratio in the UK reduced repo market liquidity, especially affecting smaller end users such as banks, insurers, pension funds and asset managers. We also show that other foreign dealers not affected by the tightening stepped into the market and gained market share, effectively benefitting from tighter UK regulation.

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Paper “When Arm’s Length is too Far” accepted for Journal of Financial Economics

My paper “When Arm’s Length is too Far: Relationship Banking over the Credit Cycle” written jointly with Thorsten Beck, Hans Degryse and Ralph de Haas has been accepted for the Journal of Financial Economics. Using data from 21 countries in central and eastern Europe we show that relationship lending alleviates credit constraints during a cyclical downturn but not during a boom period. The positive impact of relationship lending in an economic downturn is strongest for smaller and more opaque firms and in regions where the downturn is more severe.

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Pagano-Zechner price for my paper “Exporting Sovereign Stress”

My paper “Exporting Sovereign Stress: Evidence from Syndicated Bank Lending during the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis”, written together with Alex Popov won the 2016 Pagano-Zechner price for the best non-investment paper in the Review of Finance. In this paper we show that tensions in Eurozone government-bond markets were transmitted internationally through the bank lending channel. Lending by European banks with sizeable exposures to sovereign debt from the troubled Eurozone countries became impaired after the start of the crisis. This resulted in a reallocation away from foreign markets except the US and an increase in home bias.

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